interaction of two variables, namely the human being and his or her environment. 19 This fact is critical, of course, because neither variable is historically transcendental: the attitudes and core beliefs adopted by combatants change, as does the socio-military environment in which they fight. This, naturally, allows for the possibility that although the modern combatant and his socio-military environment combine to produce a susceptibility to PTSD/CSI, a very different historically specific combination could just as easily reduce, suppress or even eliminate that susceptibility.
To investigate this possibility, this article will contrast two combatants and their respective environments. Since the current diagnostic criteria for PTSD/CSI directly derives from the experiences of U.S. Vietnam veterans, the first of these combatants has to be the modern, specifically 20 th Century, American infantryman. 20 Similarly, since the American infantryman's adverse psychological reactions to combat have been retrospectively applied to ancient Greece, and since he is one of the few warriors from classical antiquity for which a reasonable degree of narrative evidence survives, the 19 C. Aldwin, Stress, Coping, and Development: An Integrative Perspective (New York, 1994) Theory, Research, and Management (London, 2007) , pp.161-81, also Shephard, A War of Nerves, . Of course, American soldiers were not fundamentally dissimilar to those troops fielded by other Western nations, nor were their responses to the experience of combat. Earlier drafts of this paper, in fact, proposed the 'Western soldier' as the modern point of comparison, but the American soldier was eventually adopted for three reasons: firstly, it was his experiences that generated the current debate regarding adverse reactions to combat; secondly, the available evidence overwhelming relates to American troops; thirdly, it was hoped the focus on one specific combatant during one specific time period would help minimise, to some degree at least, the kind of analytically unhelpful generalisations unavoidably entailed by encompassing different cultures and time periods. Similar reasons explain why the Athenian hoplite was adopted as the ancient point of comparison, instead of a more general 'Greek' warrior. second combatant will be the Athenian hoplite. 21 To maximise the force of the comparison and to avoid the charge that a modern apple is being compared to an ancient orange, these combatants have been chosen because they perform exactly the same tactical role, that is to say it is their grim task to close with and kill the enemy.
To ensure methodological clarity, the analytical distinction between the individual and his environment will be maintained throughout. Accordingly, examination of both the modern and ancient paradigms will focus on the combatant's core norms and values,
since they determine what is or is not traumatic, as well as the three most pertinent aspects of the combatant's environment, namely, the social environment, the tactical environment and lastly, the technological environment. Thereafter, the susceptibility of both paradigms to PTSD/CSI will be assessed and then compared. Finally, this article will conclude by considering the implications of this comparison for the continued viability of the universalist position.
The American Infantryman and his Environment
Obviously, it is important to acknowledge that significant points of continuity exist between the two historical case studies examined by this article. Like the American infantryman, the Athenian hoplite found the experience of combat intensely frightening, (Aristoph. Birds 289-90, 1470 -81, Clouds 350-5, Peace 444-6, 673-8, 1172 -85, 1295 -1304 Eur. Bacch. 303-4; Lys. X.8-9, 12, 21-4, XVI.17; Thuc. IV.34.7, VII.80.3; Tyrt. XI.22; Xen. Hell. IV.3.17) , but also to the appearance of its physical manifestations (Aristoph. Kn. 1055 -6, Peace 239-41, 1179 main techniques aimed at overcoming it. Firstly, it endeavoured to re-socialise its recruits, that is to say, to engineer the elimination of incongruous norms and values and their replacement with those designed to facilitate combat. 43 Secondly, it attempted to desensitise the soldier, 44 for instance, through the deification of killing, manifested by the worship of the 'spirit of the bayonet' 45 and the chanting of mantras such as 'kill, kill, kill'. 46 Thirdly, it supported its soldiers' inclination to deny their lethal activities, by encouraging them to see combat as nothing more than a series of drills identical to those carried out during training. 47 Fourthly, as Grossman observes, after particular poor performance during the Second World War, it sought to bypass any resistance to killing by embedding Pavlovian/Skinnerian conditioning techniques into skill at arms training, which henceforth presented the soldier with a stimulus in the form of a pop-up, manshaped target, for which the conditioned response was swift and accurate engagement, positively reinforced through the fall of the target, as the enemy 'died', and thereafter through progression in rank and associated privilege. Stouffer et al., Studies in Social Psychology II, p.83, against the most lethal threats he faced, the only response available to him was psychologically toxic.
This vulnerability was further aggravated by his extended exposure to combat.
Typically well trained and equipped, and supported by a sophisticated logistical apparatus, he was able and often expected to maintain contact with the enemy for many months at a time. 65 In addition, his ability to conduct operations during the hours of darkness ensured that the progressive exhaustion he experienced consequent to the physical and mental demands of extended campaigning were further compounded by sleep deprivation, which, as psychologists recognise, is a toxic combination which lowers the soldier's mental resilience and intensifies his vulnerability to psychological breakdown.
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The American soldier, therefore, demonstrated a profound propensity for PTSD/CSI as a result of a convergence of historically-specific factors. Firstly, the 
The Athenian Hoplite and his Environment
Like the American soldier, the Athenian hoplite carried into battle with him a highly distinctive set of norms and values. Unlike those influenced by Christianity, however, these were profoundly pugnacious. The explanation for this, of course, lies in the peculiar geo-political structure of Classical Greece, where a thin veneer of cultural unity overlay an aggressive agglomeration of small, fiercely independent and mutually antagonistic poleis. 67 In this singular environment, war, which the Greeks accepted as a legitimate tool of interstate relations, 68 proliferated unconstrained by enforceable international laws 69 or effective methods of conflict resolution. 70 Consequently, since the sovereignty and survival of his polis was secured by the warrior, the Greeks held nonmartial aspects of manhood secondary to battlefield bravery, 71 which they considered an unqualified social good that both defined a man and determined his social worth. 72 Naturally, as Athenian society was profoundly performative, 73 a warrior had to demonstrate rather than merely declare his bravery, 74 either by dying on the battlefield, 75 or by performing creditably in combat and earning the acclaim of those who witnessed his creditable conduct. 76 Accordingly, for the Athenians, war was more than a means of defending or advancing the interests of Athens, it was a rite of passage which guarded the boundary between adolescence and manhood.
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Of course, although armed conflict was embedded in the Athenian kosmos, the Athenians were not blind to the allure of peace: they enjoyed both its benefits and its tranquillity, and they recognised that since war entailed destruction, loss and sorrow, it should be avoided where possible. Nevertheless, despite this recognition, it is striking that expressions of humanistic sentiment are not only relatively infrequent in Athenian discourse, but most were generated by the Peloponnesian War, and those that were not are completely overshadowed by the dominant orthodoxy which fully acknowledged the human cost of war but wholeheartedly embraced it nonetheless. [18] [19] 42, XXI.2, 20, 28, 40, 74, 76, 120, 141; cf battlefield, lethal violence was not only morally unambiguous, it was also utterly unconstrained.
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The Athenians, however, did not only kill their enemies, they were also killed by them, and so many men would have witnessed the deaths of their comrades at close hand on more than one occasion. 85 Yet, whilst such losses were lamented, 86 the Athenians nevertheless chose to construe death in combat not as a premature end, but as a timely culmination. 87 Accordingly, at Athens, the war dead enjoyed a special social significance.
Having demonstrated their unimpeachable courage they reflected undying glory on both state and surviving family, 88 and in return for their sacrifice, they escaped mortality, and as something close to heroes, they were immortalised by inscriptions, and annually honoured by the spectacular state funeral Athens held for her fallen. 89 Thus, for the Athenians, death, far from dimming the bright glory of combat, was instead its most glorious aspect.
These bellicose views also received religious amplification. Admittedly, Ares, who personified the more sinister aspects of war, appears to have revolted the Greeks. 90 Furthermore, religious sentiments, by underpinning the respect normally accorded to temples, truces, heralds, holy days and enemy dead, undoubtedly offered a welcome degree of amelioration. 91 Nevertheless, there is no hint of pacifism in Greek religion, and the gods with whom men communed, usually through the medium of animal sacrifice, during which, tellingly, the victim had its throat cut with an edged weapon, 92 were often warriors themselves, and as such, they both approved of the institution of war 93 and accepted its utility in interstate relations. 94 As a result, for the Greek warrior, the gods were a potential source of support, and if their favour could be obtained by means of offerings and promises, 95 they could be induced to work for him and against his enemies.
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This ensured that the Greek warrior's relationship with his gods was both profound and pitiless, as two particularly grim examples offered by Xenophon demonstrate. In the first, he recounts how the Athenians promised to sacrifice a goat to
Artemis for every Persian they killed at Marathon. The goddess, however, was so generous that the slaughter of Persians outstripped the supply of animals, and although the Athenians subsequently sacrificed by annual instalments of five hundred goats, their blood-debt was so great that, according to Xenophon, it was still being paid nearly a hundred years after it had been incurred. 97 In the second, even more dreadful example,
Xenophon describes an awful Spartan massacre of corralled and utterly helpless enemies, which, in his view, was not only something that a Greek warrior might legitimately pray for, but its successful execution, in this instance, signified by 'heaps of corpses', could actually be considered a 'gift of heaven'.
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Although shocking to a modern reader, Xenophon's ruthless religious
Weltanschuung is entirely understandable. His formative years had been spent in the shadow of his city's patron, Athena, the warrior goddess par excellence. Her citizens paraded their military power in her honour during her festival, the Panathenaea. 99 They depicted her, in Athenian art, as the personification of Athenian martial virtue, 100 standing both with and for the Athenian hoplite, not only fighting at his side, but also celebrating his victories and grieving for his losses. 101 Most revealingly, they portrayed her, in the warrior departure scenes often found on Attic pots, displacing the hoplite's wife or mother in order to assist him while he armed himself for battle against those hostile to her polis.
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Certainly, then, the norms and values the Athenian hoplite carried with him into battle were strikingly different to those of the American infantryman, and so too was the social environment in which he fought. As a convergence of evidence demonstrates, the Athenian hoplite mobilised, deployed and fought alongside his fellow demesmen. 103 This is significant because the deme, the smallest subdivision of the Athenian body-politic, Hdt. V.77.4; Paus. I.15.3-4, with Hölscher, 'Images and Political Identity', pp.173-6; A. Villing, The Iconography of Athena in Attic Vase-painting from 440 BC -370 BC (Oxford MPhil, 1992) was also by far the most socially cohesive. 104 Most were small, rather internally-focused face-to-face communities of whose members were religiously, economically, politically and socially integrated. 105 As a consequence, affiliation amongst demesmen was so profound and normative 106 that any damage to this affiliative relationship was, for the unfortunate demesmen concerned, not merely transgressive, it was actually shameful.
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The tactical environment in which these men fought was also very different. The
Athenian hoplite was a heavy infantryman who sacrificed speed and agility in order to maximise his capacity for close-quarters combat. To protect himself from troops, such as cavalry and light infantry, whose capacity for tactical mobility surpassed his own, he fought in a phalanx, a close-order formation predicated on mutual protection and tactical interdependency. 108 Insofar as its table of organisation can be reconstructed, the Athenian phalanx seems to have been subdivided by ten medium-sized subunits, called taxeis, with each taxis in turn subdivided by an unknown number of smaller units called lochoi. 109 As the evidence suggests, demesmen were assigned to the same lochos, and deployed in tactically distinct files of men, usually eight deep, laterally arranged to produce eight serried ranks. Consequently, when the Athenian hoplite met his enemy, he did so surrounded by and in close order with his comrades.
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The technological environment in which the Athenian hoplite fought, which was largely determined by muscle-powered weapons, was also highly distinctive. 111 As he discharged his main tactical duty, to close with and kill enemy hoplites, the principal threat the Athenian hoplite faced was from the stabbing spears and slashing swords of similarly armed and equipped opponents. 112 Moreover, since he was normally protected by friendly cavalry and light infantry during deployment, the advance to contact and whilst in contact with the enemy, if he was victorious, the weapons wielded by enemy hoplites were the only threat he would face on the battlefield. 113 However, if he was ineffectively screened by supporting arms, or if that protective screen was dispersed or his own phalanx atomised by defeat, he might find himself exposed to the javelins thrown by enemy cavalry and light infantry, as well as the sling stones and arrows of enemy slingers and archers.
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In comparison to the modern infantryman, then, the range of threats faced by the Athenian hoplite was relatively restricted, and so too was the logistical and technological support he received. Typically, he mobilised with only a few days self-supplied rations, 115 and after they were consumed, he was forced to live by purchasing food from nearby markets when in neutral or friendly territory, and by plunder when in that of the enemy. 116 Accordingly, since he could live by plunder only when enemy crops were ripe, extended operations in enemy territory, such as those conducted by the Athenians on Sicily, were difficult to sustain. In addition, without the technological aids required for the amplification of ambient light, night operations, like the disastrous Athenian attack on Epipolae, were extremely risky, and therefore also comparatively rare. 
The Athenian Hoplite's Susceptibility to PTSD/CSI
It seems obvious, therefore, that the Athenian hoplite entered combat with a historically-specific set of norms and values, and that he operated in a historicallyspecific social, tactical and technological environment. What is not obvious, however, is that his pre-battle socialisation and every aspect of his environment combined to produce a historically-specific resistance to PTSD/combat stress injury.
Clearly, the religiously amplified and militarised norms and values internalised by the Athenian hoplite were stunningly congruent with his tactical role, which was to close with and kill his enemy. Consequently, he did not require re-socialisation prior to active service since he was, from childhood, continually conditioned for combat. deaths. Xenophon, for instance, describes how, at the point when an enemy formation breaks and close-quarters combat gives way to the slaughter of fleeing and panic-stricken men, the emotion typically experienced by pursuing hoplites was unbridled joy.
Furthermore, he adds, the pride men take in their own personal tally of kills tempts so many to exaggerate that their boastful claims exceed the actual body count. 119 The same feelings are also unambiguously expressed in a famous epitaph, to Pythion of Megara.
That claims Pythion was a good man because of his capacity to help his friends and harm his enemies, which he apparently demonstrated by helping to save three Athenian taxeis, which had been cut off near his homeland, probably in 446 BC, and by personally killing seven men in close-quarters combat. As Dover perceptively observes, the fact that, according to the inscription, Pythion then entered the underworld 'having brought sorrow to no one among all the men who dwell on the earth' 120 demonstrates that the sorrow of enemies was not merely inconsequential, it was actually beyond reflective consideration.
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The successful performance of his battlefield role, therefore, was not psychologically toxic to the Athenian hoplite, nor was he forced to perform it without the full support his social environment. On the contrary, he mobilised, deployed and fought together with his fellow demesmen, and so, unlike the American infantryman, whose military service entailed the ongoing disruption of his social environment, the Athenian hoplite met his enemy surrounded by the men of own cohesive community whose 124 See above, Section 1.2, n.21, also Section 3.1, ns. 112-13. available to the hoplite, uncontrolled flight, usually facilitated by the abandonment of the shield, was itself a form of direct action. 125 The second notable aspect of the technological environment is the limited duration in which the Athenian hoplite had to cope with the stresses and strains of the ancient battlefield. Main force encounters were mercifully brief, and in the absence of sophisticated logistical support, the Athenian hoplite was not typically expected to conduct extended operations, nor was he, without the ability to amplify ambient light, usually required to fight during the hours of darkness. 126 Admittedly, because the Greeks generally lacked the technology for breach and the will to storm, siege operations, normally conducted by circumvallation, did entail continuous contact with the enemy and, in consequence, such operations undoubtedly required a psychologically toxic Lazarus response, namely palliation. 127 Nevertheless, during conventional operations the Athenian hoplite was largely protected against progressive exhaustion and sleep deprivation, and all the subsequent psychological vulnerabilities entailed thereby.
128
The Athenian hoplite, therefore, was profoundly protected against PTSD/CSI as a result of a convergence of historically-specific factors. Firstly, the martial norms and values he took to the battlefield ensured that the successful performance of his battlefield role was not psychologically harmful. Secondly, his social environment allowed him to receive all the benefits that protective affiliation could provide. Thirdly, his tactical environment almost guaranteed him all the comfort he could derive from the physical proximity of his peers. Fourthly, his technological environment enabled him to confront the threats he faced during conventional operations with the most psychologically benign response, and to face those threats with his psychological resilience largely unaffected by the insidious effects of exhaustion or sleep deprivation.
Conclusion
The American infantryman and the Athenian hoplite both performed the same tactical role, and this sometimes tempts even the most impressive modern scholars to read evidence in way that equates their experiences. Nevertheless, despite the tactical similarity of these combatants, it is clear that the norms and values they carried into combat, and the social, tactical and technological environments in which they fought, were both historically-specific and radically divergent. Furthermore, it would appear that these historically-specific and radically divergent circumstances left the American infantryman critically vulnerable to PTSD/CSI whilst the Athenian hoplite was effectively immunised against the same risk. In Popperian terms, then, the Athenian hoplite is a black swan. Consequently, no matter how many white swans are marshalled in support of the universalist position, it seems that Donovan and his academic admirers are mistaken: the soldier is not, and indeed, can never be, universal.
